Back in August I highlighted an op-ed that explored a strategy meant for the Cold War that could be applied usefully to our current War on Terrorism. The op-ed author was Nick Thompson from Wired's Danger Room and the Cold war strategy (featured in the popular X-Article) is now known tho be the work of George 'X' Kennan. I should reiterate here once again that this this op-ed, the article I'm going to mention briefly, this post or the post from August is advocating a "wait them out" strategy but rather a strategy that uses inherent weaknesses of extremist ideology against them rather than using policies that strengthen their ranks and confirm their propaganda.

This brings us to the 'return' of this policy prescription; this time in next months Foreign Affairs journal (via the WSJ). The author, the centrist Brookings Institutions senior US foreign policy wonk, Philip H. Gordon argues (much like Thompson and Kennan; summarized by WSJ's Robin Moroney)

...Islamic extremists will lose the way the U.S.S.R. did, with their ideology and tactics discredited and their erstwhile supporters deserting them. Mr. Gordon says this will occur as a result of disgust at Islamic militants’ use of violence against other Muslims, the economic failures of extreme Islamic regimes and a fear in the Islamic world, evidenced in polls, of having al Qaeda-led governments.
...
Focusing on completely eradicating terrorism rather than fostering its slow demise would drag the U.S. into precisely the costly wars abroad that Osama bin Laden wants the U.S. to fight. Mr. bin Laden and his ilk are unlikely to win in the long term in any case, says Mr. Gordon, but the war in Iraq will prolong the conflict as an effective recruiting tool for al Qaeda. The U.S. should instead focus on exploiting extremist Islam’s weak points as an ideology, using diplomacy, economic development and imprisoning terrorist leaders to bring about Islamic terrorism’s slow death.

Sound, rational, logical strategy the presidential contenders should consider and a market improvement to the neocon destabilization and paranoia campaign. Of course if your platform is running on the coattails of 9/11 then you might surround yourself with discredited pseudo-scholars. Right Mr. Giuliani?

Labels: al Qaeda, counter terrorism, foreign affairs, foreign policy, FP, Osama bin Laden, terrorism, UBL

President Bush said this earlier today in his super top-secret visit to Iraq (ahhh... progress):

"General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker tell me if the kind of success we are now seeing continues, it is possible to maintain the same level of security with fewer American forces," he said.

What he really means is that he's too cowardly to reassess the situation strategically and will keep the escalation going until it can't physically be sustained without more unprecedented adjustments. So come August '08 we're looking at one of three situations. One, our Congress will gather up the willpower and begin to confront the President. More likely, two, nothing will happen in Congress. The escalation will continue as it has for months now and there will be little to show for it. As are troop levels begin to fall by the weight of their own gravity, the interests in Iraq will go back to their slightly dormant cycles. Finally three, we could reassess the situation noting the fact that we've rid Iraq of a dictator, established that they have no WMD and planted seeds of democracy in the country (perverted as they might be). Then strategically reset our occupation to one of counterterrorism and regional security leaving the Iraqi power centers room to adjust to their new government without the US military being a crutch. Accompany that with a force to protect the Kurds in the north, keep Turkey at bay, control Kurdish irredentist terrorism emanating from Kurdistan, and check Iranian influence in the northern portion of Iraq. One of these paths is logical (#3) so it won't see the light of day. The rest are just plain bad. However one will allow the White House to save face until we elect a new president. That is the road Bush wants. He claims to be loyal, he claims to support the troops. He is doing neither here, both his party and his military will suffer as a result of his intransigence.

He visited al Anbar to highlight the superficial success happening there against al Qaeda in Iraq. The White House is so desperate to stretch this war out, they'll even hijack the success of others as there own:

That assertion is part of Bush's push to sell Anbar as a success story and to hold it up to his congressional critics as a reason why the troop buildup should not be cut short.

In truth, the progress in Anbar was initiated by the Iraqis themselves, a point Gates himself made, saying the Sunni tribes decided to fight and retake control from al-Qaida many months before Bush decided to send an extra 4,000 Marines to Anbar as part of his troop buildup.

In any regard, this "success" is the fruit of a plan that works against the initial strategic vision of the escalation and one that borders on hypocrisy.

As last months NIE stated:

Such initiatives, if not fully exploited by the Iraqi government, could over time also shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority, and reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government

Labels: Anbar, benchmarks, Bush, CAP, counter terrorism, Iraq, surge

Those interested in the hunt for Usama bin Laden would be well served to read the Newsweek report on the ever-continuing hunt. Consider it a concise version of Woodward's "Bush at War" and Gary Berntsen's "Jawbreaker" with additional contemporary, reporting. Here are some snips.

This part would have made me laugh if it wasn't so serious and disappointing. Instead I just shook my head...

The Iraq War, meanwhile, has proved to be a black hole for the Americans, devouring men and material and absorbing the attention of the brass in Washington. In 2005, the CIA gave President Bush a secret slide show on the hunt for bin Laden. The president was taken aback by the small number of CIA case officers posted to Afghanistan and Pakistan. "Is that all there are?" the president asked, according to a former intelligence official, who declined to be identified discussing White House meetings. The CIA had already embarked on a "surge" of sorts, and doubled the number of officers in the field. But many were inexperienced and raw recruits, and they produced little improvement in "actionable" intelligence.

But it is encouraging to hear members of the military brain admitting these truisms

In recent months, says John Arquilla, a Special Ops expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., the U.S. military has achieved a 100-to-1 kill ratio (100 dead guerrillas to every American). But by calling in airstrikes, the Americans also kill a lot of civilians, which breeds more jihadists. And according to Thomas Johnson, also at the Naval Postgraduate School, the military's continued fixation on body counts and kill ratios is irrelevant and even counterproductive. "When you kill a person it's a multiplication factor. It demands that all the male relatives join the fight."

I, of course, have been saying this for years.

Continuing...

Johnson, an Afghan expert, spent last February at Forward Operating Base Salerno near the Pakistan border, briefing commanders on the tribal custom of Pashtunwali. He says only about 5 percent of American troops in Afghanistan ever leave their bases—a statistic, he believes, that explains better than any other why Americans are struggling in the battle for intelligence. He says most soldiers in Afghanistan don't know simple phrases like "stop," "go," or "put your hands up." Americans continually make cultural blunders, like using canine units to search people's homes (dogs are considered unclean in Muslim culture). Meanwhile the Taliban works at winning the trust and confidence of villagers—or intimidating them. "They go into villages and say, 'The Americans have the watches but we have the time. We might not come back in a week or a year, but you bet your britches we'll eventually come back'," says Johnson.

If the White House wants to use historical "comparisons" this one should definitely be first of their list...

During the early days of the cold war, the old boys who ran the CIA began to reason that when it came to fighting against an underhanded foe in a battle for global survival, the rules of fair play they had learned as schoolboys no longer applied. If the communists fight dirty, we must, too, they rationalized—or freedom would perish. This ends-justifying-the-means rationale led to foolish and ultimately unsuccessful assassination plots and other dirty tricks that disgraced and demoralized the CIA when the agency's so-called Crown Jewels were revealed during Watergate. After 9/11, Bush administration officials, particularly Vice President Cheney, vowed to take the gloves off against Al Qaeda.

or maybe this on Bush's reeducation camps in his Vietnam-Iraq misrepresentation from last week

The danger now, says Arquilla, is that the longer the Iraq War goes on, the more skilled the new generations of jihadists will become. "They're getting re-educated," he says. "The first generation of Al Qaeda came through the [Afghan] camps. The second generation are those who've logged on [to Islamist Web sites]. The next generation will be those who have come through the crucible of Iraq. Eventually, their level of skill is going to be greater than the skill of the original generation."

Labels: Afghanistan, Bush, Cheney, counter terrorism, foreign policy, Iraq, Osama bin Laden, terrorism

Continuing on my post from last night on Giulian's foreign policy essay, the wonks at Democracy Arsenal have some fun at Rudy's expense. Apparently it's not so serious yet seeing that he's so far away from even being considered a candidate and even further away from scaring the hell out of everyone and then playing Mayor of US during the '08 election. Here are some clippings...

Parts of Iraq would undoubtedly fall under the sway of our enemies, particularly Iran, which would use its influence to direct even more terror at U.S. interests and U.S. allies than it does today. (Irony alert: Iran's growing influence is a direct result of our invasion or Iraq. But more to the point, would Iran be directing terror at the US if we weren't in Iraq today? This is a self-defeating argument. Rudy is saying we can't leave Iraq because it will embolden Iran, and yet it's our very presence, which has emboldened them in the first place. Ugh, my head hurts, I need a cold beverage.)

Our allies would conclude that we cannot back up our commitments with sustained action. (Boy, it sure seems that Iraq and Afghanistan has proved that point rather nicely. Tora Bora ring any bells.)

Our enemies -- both terrorists and rogue states -- would be emboldened. (Where do I even start? How about the July NIE report on AQ, "TThe National Intelligence Estimate assessment indicates that the Islamic terrorist organization's rise has been bolstered by the Iraq war and the failure to counter extremism in Pakistan's tribal areas." What was that part about backing up our commitments with sustained action?

That's just one graf! On and on it goes. Here's another graf that is astounding:

Another step in rebuilding a strong diplomacy will be to make changes in the State Department and the Foreign Service. The time has come to refine the diplomats' mission down to their core purpose: presenting U.S. policy to the rest of the world.

Our ambassadors must clearly understand and clearly advocate for U.S. policies and be judged on the results. Too many people denounce our country or our policies simply because they are confident that they will not hear any serious refutation from our representatives. The American ideals of freedom and democracy deserve stronger advocacy. And the era of cost-free anti-Americanism must end.

That's right, people are angry at America, not because of our policies, but because they know they can criticize us with impunity. And this nugget is featured in a section titled "Determined Diplomacy."

and...

"The Terrorists’ War on Us.” When I read this, I almost started laughing. Is he serious? I had read that Giuliani was starting to use this odd-sounding phrase, but he is apparently intent on trademarking it, and using it all the freaking time. As Matt points out, this enough is reason to hope to God he is defeated.

“Peace through Strength”: Orwellian prose alert. If a Democrat said this, I’d be cool, but it really does sound ominous coming from someone who has Normon Podheretz on his foreign policy team.

“The next U.S president must also press ahead with building a national missile defense system.” Oh God, why are conservatives obsessed with this?

Btw, I was surprised to see that this article had a somewhat lumbering prose. I can’t quite put my finger on it, but the writing style doesn’t quite seem right. For example, “the lesson is never talk for the sake of talking and never accept a bad deal for the sake of making a deal.” What the heck is that? UPDATE: Good, it's not just me. Apparently Kevin Drum feels the same way. He seems to think that a 9-year old wrote the essay. It is possible.

“It is better to give people a hand up than a handout.” Good job advisor #4.

Labels: counter terrorism, diplomacy, foreign affairs, foreign policy

This comes from a post at National Security Intelligence by Tom Quiggin (his work was celebrated here) and Sir Richard Dearlove. The post was the first in a pair that argue that secrecy, while necessary in certain circumstances, can in fact hinder the counter terrorism process, among other things... I'll leave interested readers free to read the posts but want to archive the "rules" here and comment. They write...

Louise Richardson, author of The Roots of Terrorism, spells out six rules for countering terrorism to which we can add a seventh. They are:

• Have a defensible and achievable goal;

• Live by your principles – don’t be goaded by the terrorist into behaving differently;

• Know your enemy, intimately;

• Isolate terrorists within their own communities;

• Engage others in countering terrorism with you;

• Have patience and keep your perspective – be prepared for the long-term;

• Build a process which is unambiguous and can function strategically and operationally and in is open-ended.

In order of appearance... I don't think eradicating terrorism is a "defensible" goal. Limiting it and starving it of sustenance is better. President Bush seemed to be on the verge of getting this in his recent press conference when he said "[i]t matters to the security of people here at home if we don't work to change the conditions that cause 19 kids to be lured onto airplanes to come and murder our citizens." He was speaking of Iraq here so he still hasn't comprehended the fact that Iraq is precisely the condition he is referring to.

"Live by you principles." Good God we have lost that round. PATRIOT ACT, FISA, unilateralism, torture, habeas corpus...

"Know your enemy." What is the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite? And a Kurd? What is the difference al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and al Qaeda of 9/11 and all the other al Qaeda outfits. The difference between al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and a Baathist insurgent? They are not all the same and saying they are is lowest common denominator drivel for the masses and does nothing for the war and much for propaganda.

Isolate to terrorists. That's hard to do, especially when your actions facilitate there survival. They are everywhere, anywhere; but at the same time nowhere.

Accept the help of others. Mixed bag. We went into Afghanistan with the international community, although some (Rummy and Cheney) wanted otherwise. Those two won the argument as we went into Iraq (with little genuine international support). Now we're begging for a larger UN presence. And you know what? We're lucky for it. If the UN had the belligerence of some in the Bush Administration they'd ignore us. Furthermore, we skip opportunities to try to incorporate enemies (Syria and Iran) into our effort. Without exploring this avenue we not only dump the precedent of talking to our enemies we leave a stone unturned.

Prepare for the long-term. Meaning don't use (the threat of) terrorism for politics. Short-term gains against terrorism often give terrorist a rhetorical card to use in the long-term (justification for actions and recruitment). It should be clear that the "long war" will not be won with a military. Especially without a viable political track. Iraq is making that painfully clear.

Open-endedness. best covered by Quiggin: "This will require training and practice exercises, as well as scenario planning and building capacity. Little point exists for working in stove pipes which merely come together, if at all, at the top level. Stated another way, we need to escape from the tyranny of the tactical and advance to a strategic, whole-of-government approach."

Labels: Afghanistan, counter terrorism, foreign policy, Iraq, WoT